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ABSTRACT
Attacking deep learning based biometric systems has drawn
more and more attention with the wide deployment of finger-
print/face/speaker recognition systems, given the fact that the
neural networks are vulnerable to the adversarial examples,
which have been intentionally perturbed to remain almost im-
perceptible for human. In this paper, we demonstrated the ex-
istence of the universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) for
the speaker recognition systems. We proposed a generative
network to learn the mapping from the low-dimensional nor-
mal distribution to the UAPs subspace, then synthesize the
UAPs to perturbe any input signals to spoof the well-trained
speaker recognition model with high probability. Experimen-
tal results on TIMIT and LibriSpeech datasets demonstrate
the effectiveness of our model.
Index Terms— Universal Adversarial Perturbations,
Adversarial Examples Generation, Deep Learning Attack,
Speaker Recognition
1. INTRODUCTION
With the success of deep neural networks (DNNs) since
Krizhevsky et al. [1] won the ImageNet challenge [2] in 2012,
more and more deep-based models for biometric systems,
such as fingerprint/face/speaker recognition, have been de-
ployed in our daily life. However, these systems are facing
the risk of being attacked since deep models are vulnerable to
adversarial examples [3], which have been intentionally per-
turbed. Meanwhile, attacking the deep models and finding the
weaknesses of the models can help us avoid the potential risk
and design corresponding methods to defense against these at-
tacks. In these widely deployed biometric systems, previous
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works mainly focus on the vision-based systems, the audio-
based systems, such as speaker recognition, have not been
well-studied, although the speaker recognition systems have
been widely deployed. In this paper, we focus on the attack
for speaker recognition models by generating the universal
adversarial perturbations (UAPs), which are independent of
the input samples and can be applied to the whole dataset.
Before UAPs have been found by Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. [4], generating the adversarial examples and spoofing the
well-trained deep models have become an emerging topic
since Szegedy et al. [5] found DNNs are vulnerable to the
adversarial examples with intentional imperceptible pertur-
bations. Following [5], some other optimization methods,
such as Adam [6], Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3]
or the genetic algorithm [7] are used to find the perturbations
for the input image. Recently, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [4]
demonstrated that there exists a universal and small pertur-
bation that can spoof the well-trained DNN image classifier
with high probability. Subsequently, Hayes et al. [8] crafted
the UAPs by leveraging a generative network to synthesize the
perturbation from the input noise which samples from the nor-
mal distribution, and improved the attack success rate as well
as showed the transferability cross different models for the
same dataset. Motivated by the existence of UAPs in the im-
age classification, in this paper, we attempt to find the UAPs
of the speaker recognition systems by designing a generative
model [8].
In addition to attacking the vision-based systems, the at-
tack for speaker recognition systems has also been addressed
for a long time. Before the DNNs have been used in the
speaker recognition, the replay and synthesis attacks had been
studied to avoid the risk in the voice verification systems [9].
In recent years, with the wide deployment of DNN-based sys-
tems, attacking the DNN-based speaker recognition models
has drawn more and more attention. Gong et al. [10] crafted
the adversarial examples using FGSM to attack the well-
trained speech verification model and showed the deep mod-
els are vulnerable to the adversarial attack. However, the evi-
dence is missing on large-scale datasets [10]. Using the same
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optimization method, Kreuk et al. [11] presented white box
attacks for text-dependent speaker verification on the deep
end-to-end network on NTIMIT [12] and YOHO [13].
In this paper, we attempt to generate the UAPs by learning
the mapping from the low-dimensional normal distribution to
the universal perturbation subspace via a generative model,
given the fact that the UAPs are not unique [4]. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of our proposed method by attack-
ing the state-of-the-art speaker recognition model [14] under
non-targeted and targeted settings on TIMIT [15] and Lib-
riSpeech [16] datasets. Our contributions can be summarized
as follows:
• We demonstrate the existence of the UAPs for the well-
trained speaker recognition model, which are the poten-
tial risks for the widely deployed speaker recognition
systems in our daily life.
• We can synthesize different UAPs efficiently by map-
ping the normal distribution into the UAPs subspace
using the generative model. The experimental results
show that our model can achieve an SER of 97.0 with
an SNR of 49.87 and a PESQ of 3.00 in the non-
targeted attack on TIMIT dataset, indicating the effec-
tiveness of our proposed model.
• The ablation study for the UAPs shows that our pro-
posed model can learn useful universal patterns, map
the low-dimensional normal distribution into the UAPs
subspace, and generate UAPs that perform much better
than the random perturbations.
2. RELATEDWORKS
2.1. UAPs Generation
The existence of UAPs have been demonstrated in many areas
[17, 18] , since Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [4] found the UAPs in
the image classification. Here we mainly review some UAPs
generation models on image classification and audio-based
systems that are related to our work. Different from the itera-
tive optimization method used in [4], Hayes et al. [8] crafted
the UAPs by leveraging a generative network to synthesize the
perturbation from the input noise which samples from the nor-
mal distribution, and improved the attack success rate as well
as showed the transferability cross different models for the
same dataset. In addition to the works in image classification,
some works about UAPs generation for audio-based systems
are also proposed recently. Neekhara et al. [18] iteratively
searched the UAPs with minimal norm under the constraint of
high attacking success rate, and only one UAP can be found
in once optimization. Our work is different from the above
two works in two aspects: (1) our work focuses on the un-
explored task, speaker recognition, to study the potential risk
of the widely deployed authentication systems; (2) our gener-
ative attacker can synthesize different UAPs efficiently once
trained, which has been demonstrated more effective than the
iterative methods in image classification attacks [8].
2.2. Speaker Recognition Attack
Attacking the speaker recognition models has drawn the re-
searchers’ attention because: (1) deep model attacking has
become a hot topic in the machine learning community; (2)
the speaker recognition/verification systems have been widely
deployed in our daily life. Gong et al. crafted the adversarial
examples iteratively to attack the speaker recognition model
trained on a small dataset and demonstrated the existence of
the adversarial example for the speaker recognition models.
Subsequently, Kreuk et al. [11] attempted to fool the end-to-
end speaker verification model which is trained on MFCC fea-
tures by optimizing the perturbation using FGSM [3]. How-
ever, these white-box attacks need gradients in the testing
phase. In this paper, we proposed a semi-white attack model
to learn the UAPs, which is more practical than the white box
methods in the real scenario because: (1) our generative at-
tacker needs no gradient in the testing stage; (2) the adver-
sarial perturbations are universal and they can spoof the well-
trained speaker recognition model with any input speeches.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our generative attacker aims to map
the input noise, which is sampled from the low-dimensional
normal distribution N (0, 1), into a UAP, and the following
well-trained speaker recognition model is spoofed by the in-
put adversarial example, which is perturbed by the gener-
ated UAP. Given a speech s and its speaker label y, the non-
targeted attack for the speaker recognition model with UAPs
can be formulated as:
argmin
s′
L(s, s+ δ) s.t. f(s+ δ) = y′ (1)
where δ = Gθ(z) and y′ 6= y,
whereG is the generative attack model to synthesize the UAP
δ from the noise z, y′ is the prediction of the adversarial ex-
ample s′ = s + δ, f is a well-trained state-of-the-art speaker
recognition model, L is a distance function to measure the
distortion between the raw signal and the adversarial exam-
ple. For the targeted attack, we modify the constraint for y′
from y′ 6= y as y′ = yt, in which yt is the target class.
3.1. The Victim Model
We use the state-of-the-art speaker recognition model Sinc-
Net [14] as our target victim model. SincNet achieved state-
of-the-art performance on TIMIT [15] and LibriSpeech [16]
datasets by replacing the first convolution layer as the learn-
able band pass filters. Given the frequency band [f1, f2], the
learnable band pass filter can be described as:
2
Fig. 1. The framework for our proposed universal adversarial perturbations generative network for speaker recognition.
h[n, f1, f2] = 2f2sinc(2pif2n)− 2f1sinc(2pif1n), (2)
where sinc(x) = sinx/x, and f1, f2 are the learnable param-
eters. By using the band pass filters rather than the convolu-
tion filters in the first layer, the model is more interpretable
and achieves better results [14].
3.2. The Framework
Our model aims to spoof the well-trained speaker recognition
model with UAPs. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the Generator is a
generative network with several upsampling blocks to synthe-
size the UAP from the input noise with 100 dimensions (fol-
lowing [8]), which samples from the standard normal distri-
bution N (0, 1). Subsequently, the UAP is scaled to control
the distortion for the real data before being added on the input
raw speech data with the real label Tom. The Speaker Recog-
nition model, which is fixed and well-trained, is spoofed by
the adversarial examples, which are the input speech data with
UAPs, and predicts the input as Jerry by mistake.
Since the UAPs are not unique [4], we use a Generator to
learn the mapping from the normal distribution into the UAP
subspace. We use several UpBlocks to synthesize the high-
dimensional UAPs from the low-dimensional noise, and the
convolution layer, batchnorm [19], and ReLU [20] are used
in each UpBlock.
3.3. Optimization
The optimization objective of our model is to find the adver-
sarial examples with the smallest distortion, and they can at-
tack the well-trained speaker recognition model successfully.
Given the input noise z, the raw speech data s and its class
label y, the goal above can be formulated as follows:
g = Rx,δ − λDx,x+δ, (3)
where R denotes the attack success Rate, D denotes the
Distortion, λ is the hyper-parameter to get a trade-off between
R and D, δ = G(z) is the UAP. In the optimization this ob-
jective function will be maximized.
In non-targeted attacks, attacking successfully means the
victim model predicts by mistake, so we can optimize the at-
tack success rate by reducing the prediction probability for
the true class, and increasing the prediction probability for
any wrong class. To spoof the victim model with minimal
cost, we increase the probability for the class which is the
top-1 class except for the true class. So R can be formulated
as follows:
Rx,δ =
{
max
j 6=y
pj − py, if R < T
T, else,
(4)
where p = f(x+ δ) is the output of pre-softmax layer (logit)
with the adversarial example as input, T is a threshold to stop
the optimize for this sample. In targeted attacks, the attack is
successful as long as the prediction class is the target class.
Given the target class t, R can be formulated as follows:
Rx,δ,t =
{
pt −max
j 6=t
pj , if R < T
T, else.
(5)
The distortion for UAPs can be measured in two aspects:
the objective quality and the perceptual quality. We use
Signal-Noise Ratio (SNR) and the Perceptual Evaluation of
Speech Quality (PESQ) score [21] to evaluate the quality of
the adversarial examples with perturbations in objective and
perceptual, respectively. SNR is defined as:
SNR(x, x′) = 10 log10
‖x‖2
‖x− x′‖2 , (6)
where x′ = x + δ is the adversarial example with the pertur-
bation δ. PESQ, as an ITU-T recommendation standard [22],
is an integrated model to measure the distortion for the speech
in telephony. It is a full-reference algorithm with range
[−0.5, 4.5] to measure the perceptual quality of the speech
after a temporal alignment. It is worth mentioning that PESQ
is not differentiable, so we only use it in the testing phase. In
the training phase, D is only the SNR and we just optimize
SNR by minimizing the L2 norm of the perturbations.
3.4. Inference
The inference is not intuitive because the input data are with
variable lengths. In the training phase, we can clip the data
into slices with a fixed length, but in the testing phase, we
can not just drop the data beyond the UAPs. In our imple-
mentation, we use a simple but effective method repeat+clip
3
to repeat the UAP until it is longer than the input sample and
then clip it to make them two matched. In our experiments,
we will conduct comparison experiment to study the influence
of different UAP lengths.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. Datasets and Metric
Datasets: Following [14], which proposed our victim model,
we conduct the experiments on TIMIT [15] (462 speakers to-
tally) and LibriSpeech [16] (2484 speakers totally) datasets.
The training/testing split follows the official implementation
of [14], in which 2310/1386 samples are used for train-
ing/testing in TIMIT, and 14481/7452 samples are used for
training/testing in LibriSpeech.
Metric: We use the sentence error rate (SER) to represent the
attack success rate in the non-targeted attack, and the predic-
tion target rate (PTR) is used in targeted attacks because the
attack is successful as long as the prediction is the target class
in the targeted attack. The distortion is measured by SNR (for
objective quality) and PESQ (for perceptual quality), as in-
troduced in subsection 3.3. We use the official open-source
implementation 1 for PESQ in our experiments.
4.2. Implementation Details
Our Generator can only synthesize UAPs with the fixed
length, so we randomly select a slice with a fixed length from
the raw speech data in training phase. In our experiments,
we synthesize UAPs for 200ms, which is 3200 dimensional
because the data are with a sampling rate of 16000. We use
the pretrained victim model which is released by the author
of [14] 2. The hyper-parameter λ will be finetuned in our
experiments and the scale factor is fixed as 1 because the per-
turbations are constrained on a small scale by the distortion
item in our optimization objective. The threshold T for non-
targeted/targeted attack is set as 10/0 after being finetuned to
get a good trade-off between R and D. Besides, we initialize
the biases and weights of the last convolution layer as zero
to ensure that no perturbation is added on the signals at the
beginning of the training3.
4.3. Non-Targeted Attack
We conduct the non-targeted attack on TIMIT and Lib-
riSpeech datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed model. The results of these two datasets are illustrated
in Table. 1. We can observe from the results that:
• For non-targeted attacks, the UAPs exist and our model
manages to map the normal distribution into the UAPs
1https://github.com/dennisguse/ITU-T pesq
2https://github.com/mravanelli/SincNet
3The code, data, and pretrained models will be released soon.
Table 1. Non-targeted attack on TIMIT/LibriSpeech dataset
Dataset λ SER(%)↑ SNR(dB)↑ PESQ↑
TIMIT
- 1.52? - -
500 97.5 44.13 2.13
1000 94.9 46.76 2.40
1500 97.0 49.87 3.00
2000 93.9 49.77 2.92
2500 92.4 50.49 2.79
Libri
- 0.30? - -
1500 99.7 28.87 2.09
2000 97.0 30.62 2.22
2500 96.3 31.15 2.33
3000 93.7 32.72 2.45
3500 94.7 33.68 2.54
? Error rate without attack on TIMIT/LibriSpeech.
subspace because our model can synthesize the UAPs
which can attack the well-trained speaker recognition
model with high success rate.
• On the TIMIT dataset, with λ = 1500, the UAPs
generated by our model can attack the well-trained
speaker recognition model with an SNR of 49.87dB
and a PESQ of 3.00, which means that the noise is no-
ticeable but not intrusive.
• On the LibriSpeech dataset, with λ = 2500, the UAPs
generated by our model can attack the well-trained
speaker recognition model with an SNR of 31.15dB
and a PESQ of 2.33, which means that the noise is no-
ticeable and a little intrusive.
• On both TIMIT and LibriSpeech datasets, by tuning λ,
we can control the trade-off between the attack success
rate and the adversarial example quality.
It is worth mentioning that the random perturbations in non-
targeted attack can also achieve a high SER as long as the
perturbations are intense enough, so a high SER here can-
not provide enough evidence that our model has learned some
useful universal patterns. In Section 5, we will compare the
UAPs generated by our model with the random perturbations
to show that our model has learned the universal patterns.
4.4. Targeted Attack
In this subsection, we show our model’s effectiveness on the
targeted attack. In the targeted attack, we fix λ as 3000/2000
for TIMIT/LibriSpeech dataset, respectively. We randomly
select 5 speakers from TIMIT/LibriSpeech dataset as the tar-
gets, and attack the victim model to misclassify any input
sample as the target class. The attack results are illustrated
in Table. 2. Some conclusions can be drawn from the results:
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Table 2. Targeted attack on TIMIT/LibriSpeech dataset
Dataset Target PTR(%)↑ SNR(dB)↑ PESQ↑
TIMIT
0 99.1 48.09 2.49
100 98.4 48.86 2.41
200 98.0 48.55 2.52
300 93.9 48.93 2.42
400 96.6 48.20 2.55
avg 97.2 48.53 2.48
Libri
0 64.5 29.73 2.10
500 40.8 30.73 2.14
1000 64.9 30.13 2.08
1500 54.9 29.75 2.07
2000 95.5 29.38 2.18
avg 64.1 29.94 2.11
Fig. 2. The influence of the UAPs’ length.
• For the targeted attack, the UAPs exist and our model
is successful to synthesize UAPs for the targeted attack
on both TIMIT and LibriSpeech datasets.
• On the TIMIT dataset, we can achieve a PTR of 97.2%
on average with an SNR of 48.53dB and a PESQ of
2.48, which means that the noise is noticeable, and a
little intrusive, given the fact that the targeted attack is
more challenging than the non-targeted attack.
• On the LibriSpeech dataset, we can achieve a PTR of
64.1% on average with an SNR 29.94dB and a PESQ of
2.11. This is not as good as that on the TIMIT dataset,
because the speaker number in LibriSpeech (2484) is
much more than that in TIMIT dataset (462).
Besides, the high success rate here can demonstrate that our
model has learned the universal patterns for the targeted at-
tack. Although random perturbations are able to achieve a
high SER in non-targeted attack, they will fail to achieve a
high PTR in targeted attack because they are random. Thus a
high PTR in targeted attack can demonstrate that our model
has learned the useful universal patterns.
5. ABLATION STUDY
5.1. The Length of UAPs
We can only generate UAPs with a fixed length, but the in-
put signals are with variable lengths. So we use repeat+clip
method to make them two matched. The length of the UAPs
may affect the performance of our model, so in this subsec-
tion, we conduct experiments to study how the UAP length
influences the attacking performance. We generate the UAPs
with duration 200ms, 400ms, and 600ms on TIMIT dataset,
and we plot the SER-SNR and SER-PESQ curves to take both
the adversarial examples quality and the attack success rate
into account. Besides, we compare our generated UAPs with
the random noise, which are the random perturbations sam-
pled from the normal distribution N (0, σ2) (σ is tuned to get
five results with different trade-offs between SNR/PESQ with
SER).
As illustrated in Fig. 2, a curve is higher than another
means that this model can achieve a higher SER with the same
SNR/PESQ, indicating this model performs better than the
other. From Fig. 2 (a), we can observe that: (1) the UAPs gen-
erated by our model perform better than the random perturba-
tions, indicating that our model has learned the useful uni-
versal patterns; (2) with SNR below 50dB, UAPs with differ-
ent lengths achieve comparable performance, but with SNR
higher 50dB, the shorter the UAPs are, the better performance
they can achieve; (3) with UAPs length as 600ms, UAPs gen-
erated by our model may perform not as good as the random
perturbations when SNR is higher than 52dB, the reason may
be the models for longer UAPs are more difficult to train but
we train all models for different UAPs lengths for the same
epochs to make a fair comparison. From Fig. 2 (b), sim-
ilar conclusions can be drawn except that the UAPs gener-
ated by our model performs much better with PESQ higher
than 2.5 because the random perturbations struggle to achieve
good perceptual quality (PESQ). On both the objective qual-
ity (SNR) and perceptual quality (PESQ), the UAPs generated
by our model perform better than the random perturbations,
demonstrating that our model has learned the useful universal
patterns to attack the well-trained speaker recognition model.
5.2. Noise Interpolation
To demonstrate our model is able to map the noise into the
UAP subspace, we synthesize UAPs from the noise which is
interpolated from two random noises and evaluate these UAPs
on attacking the well-trained speaker recognition model. With
an interpolation parameter β, the interpolation noise z′ can
be obtained by: z′ = βz1 + (1 − β)z2, where z1 and z2 are
two low-dimensional noise vectors sampled from the normal
distribution N (0, 1). As illustrated in Table 3, with different
β, the UAPs generated by our model can achieve similar SER,
SNR, and PESQ, validating our model can map N (0, 1) into
the UAPs subspace indirectly.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we attempted to demonstrate the existence of the
UAPs for the speaker recognition, and we proposed a genera-
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Table 3. Noise interpolation results (SER) on TIMIT datasets
β 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
SER(%)↑ 98.3 97.2 96.9 94.5 97.5 98.0
SNR(dB)↑ 49.6 50.0 50.1 50.5 49.8 49.5
PESQ↑ 2.99 3.02 3.04 3.05 3.01 2.99
tive network to map the low-dimensional noise space into the
UAPs subspace to synthesize the UAPs efficiently. Experi-
mental results showed that our model can generate UAPs and
fool the state-of-the-art speaker recognition model with high
success rate. The ablation study provided enough evidence to
show that our model had learned useful universal patterns for
attacking the well-trained speaker recognition model. We en-
vision our work to provide a benchmark for universal attacks
for speaker recognition.
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